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COMMENTS 
Copyright Pre-emption and Character Values: 
The Paladin Case as an Extension 
of Sears and Compco 
Victor DeCosta, a Rhode Island mechanic with a fourth-grade 
education, traveled through the western states as a youth, and as 
a result of his occasional jobs as a ranch-hand he developed a "pas-
sion for all things western." He subsequently returned to Rhode 
Island, but maintained his avocation by appearing in horse shows, 
rodeos, parades, and similar events. In his public appearances he 
dressed as a cowboy and gave fast-draw demonstrations; and, over 
the course of years he developed a costume consisting of black shirt 
and pants, flat-crowned black hat, a St. Mary's medal, and a mous-
tache. He also adopted the nickname "Paladin," after "an onlooker 
of Italian descent had hurled an epithet at him containing the word 
'Paladino.' " When DeCosta found out that the word "paladin" 
meant "champion of knights," he took the chess knight as his sym-
bol and had it imprinted on business cards along with the slogan, 
"Have Gun, Will Travel-Wire Paladin, North Court Street, Cran-
ston, Rhode Island.'' DeCosta distributed the cards and photographs 
of himself at personal appearances, placed quantities of them in 
commercial establishments, and eventually gave away over 250,000 
of the business cards to the general public. Despite all of these activ-
ities, however, he never charged a fee or sold a product, but sought 
only the entertainment of his audiences. 
Some ten years after DeCosta had developed the role of Paladin, 
the CBS television series "Have Gun, Will Travel1' appeared. The 
hero of this series was also called Paladin, his costume was identical 
to DeCosta's, and he distributed similar business cards with San 
Francisco substituted for Cranston, Rhode Island. The series proved 
to be a great success and had grossed over fourteen million dollars 
by the time DeCosta brought a suit for damages in the United States 
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, based on three causes 
of action: misappropriation, trade or service mark infringement, and 
unfair competition. The trial court reserved judgment on the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss as to the trademark and unfair compe-
tition claims and submitted the case to the jury on instructions that 
DeCosta would be entitled to a verdict if he established: (1) that he 
had created the original "idea and character of 'Paladin, Have Gun 
Will Travel'"; (2) that he had not abandoned it by publication;1 
and (3) that the defendants had copied the "character and idea" 
without permission. 
l. See text accompanying notes 49-51 infra. 
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The jury returned a $150,000 verdict for the plaintiff,2 but the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,3 holding that a state-
created grant of protection in these circumstances was foreclosed by 
the rule of federal pre-emption announced by the Supreme Court in 
Sears, Roebuck b Co. v. Stifjel Co.4 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc.: 
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state 
law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying 
would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, Section 8 
of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of 
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copy-
right laws leave in the public domain.11 
The Supreme Court subsequently refused to grant certiorari in 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta (Paladin),6 thus 
leaving unresolved the scope of the pre-emption doctrine enunciated 
in Sears and Compco.7 
Much of the confusion over copyright pre-emption that has fol-
lowed in the wake of Sears and Compco may be due to a funda-
mental difference between the present patent and copyright acts. 
Unlike the patent law that was at issue in Sears and Compco, the 
federal Copyright Act8 provides that the states may in limited cir-
cumstances protect literary property through the doctrine of com-
mon-law copyright. Under section 2 of the Act, a state may prevent 
copying of a work so long as it remains "unpublished."9 An alter-
2. The trial court decision was unreported. 
3. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967) [herein-
after referred to as the principal case]. 
4. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
5. 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964). This language is quoted in the principal case at 319. 
6. 36 U.S.L.W. 3242 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1967). 
7. Courts have refused to apply pre-emption based on Sears and Compco in a wide 
variety of cases. See, e.g., Servo Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965) (unfair competition without 
showing of secondary meaning); Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown 
Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (misappropriation of news stories); 
Edgar H. Wood Associates v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964) (common-
law cop}Tight); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 
·12 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (misappropriation, "deceptive and 
fraudulent practices"); Greater Recording Co. v. Stambler, 144 U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1965) ("record piracy"); American Broadcasting Co. v. Button World Mfg., 
Inc., 151 U.S.P.Q. 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (public deception liberally interpreted). 
But cf. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 989 (1965); Flamingo Tclefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 22 App. 
Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1964). See also Comment, Copyright-The Law o/ 
Publication, 35 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 158 (1967). 
8. 17 U.S.C. chs. 1-3 (1964). 
9. 17 u.s.c. § 2 (1964): 
Nothing in this title shall be construed to ;mnul or limit the right of the 
author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to 
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his 
consent, and to obtain damages therefor. 
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native ground of decision in Paladin was that, regardless of pre-
emption under Sears and Compco, DeCosta had divested himself 
of any potential common-law rights in his creation through the 
unrestricted distribution of calling cards and photographs. In so 
holding, the court apparently assumed that the question of whether 
a divestitive publication had occurred should be determined by 
federal standards. But the weight of judicial opinion, at least before 
Sears and Compco, supports the use of state standards to determine 
whether common-law rights have been divested.10 There is some 
support for this position in the text of the Copyright Act itself: 
since section 2 of the Act refers to state laws of literary property, 
it should include the state definition of divestitive publication.11 
However, this approach was frequently criticized by Judge 
Learned Hand, who feared that the fundamental policies of the copy-
right clause of the Constitution12 could be subverted if the states 
were allowed to establish independent criteria for determining what 
acts constitute a publication sufficient to divest the author's common-
law rights. Hand's conclusion follows from the nature of copyright. 
Any form of copyright, whether common law or statutory, is essen-
tially a grant of monopoly power to prevent others from repro-
ducing and exploiting the work.13 By the Constitution, only Con-
gress is empowered to create a monopoly in intellectual property;1·1 
and, because the copyright clause provides that ·writings may be pro-
tected only for "limited times," Congress has created the statutory 
copyright in return for a subsequent dedication of the work to the 
public domain upon expiration of the copyright.15 Clearly, state 
protection of a work after expiration of the federal copyright could 
impair this scheme and undermine the policy of allowing later au-
thors to draw freely upon plots, characters, and other material in 
the public domain.16 Similar undesirable results could follow if the 
states are allowed to establish a liberal standard of publication, 
10. See generally Bender, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 CoLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 1228 (1964); Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 185 (1956). 
11. Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1079, 1094 (1959). 
12. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ·writings and Discoveries ..•. " 
13. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 
712 (1940). 
14. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). See also 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(dissenting opinion). 
15. G. Ricardi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); RCA l\Ifg. Co. v. 
Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89 (1940). 
16. G. Ricardi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952). In Sears the Supreme 
Court observed that "[o]bviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or 
give a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal 
patents." 376 U.S. at 231 (footnote omitted). But cf. Bender, supra note IO. 
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permitting substantial economic exploitation without divestment, 
for works that could be copyrighted under the federal Act. Since 
the monopoly granted under common-law Gopyright has no fixed 
duration it may be considered perpetual, and under a liberal stan-
dard of publication the creator would have little incentive to seek 
the limited-term protection of the Act.17 
Nevertheless, the court in Paladin could have reached the op-
posite result as to divestitive publication, even under a federal stan-
dard. If the creation as a whole were characterized as a dramatic 
work, it could have been brought within the doctrine that a perfor-
mance of a work does not divest the author of his common-law rights.18 
The central question would then have been whether Paladin is the 
kind of character that is entitled to copyright protection; and, the 
answer would have been found through tests formulated primarily 
to deal with the problem of character piracy in novels. The terms 
"well-developed"19 and "individualized"20 are often used to denote 
17. Note, "Copyright" Protection for Uncopyrightables: The Common-Law Doc-
trines, 108 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 699, 704-05 (1960). Because of the possibility of perpetual 
monopoly, it may be asked how any common-law copyright could be recognized under 
the "limited-times" provision of the Constitution. It has been suggested that a 
monopoly limited in use or ability to exploit by the concept of divestitive publication 
is the functional equivalent of a time limitation. Kalodner &: Vance, supra note 11, at 
1082-83. On the question of whether courts acting under common-law principles 
could limit their protection to the time provisions of the federal Act, compare Cheney 
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1952), with Kaplan, Performer's Right 
and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69 HARV. L. R.Ev. 409, 419 (1956), and 
Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 
U. PA. L. R.Ev. 469, 487 (1955). 
18. Fen-is v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912). For a more recent application of the 
doctrine, see King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.)". 1963). See also 
M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 53 (1967). 
19. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 
282 U.S. 902 (1931) (dictum). 
20. Burns v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 75 F. Supp. 986 (D. Mass. 1948). 
Attempts at formulating a general definition of the "well-developed" character, how-
ever, have not been notably successful. The following definition is proposed in Parish, 
Statutory Copyright Protection of Fictional Characters, 8 lDEA 455, 456 (1964) (foot-
note omitted): 
The multiple aspects of a fictional character include the outer or objective 
individual and the inner or subjective person ...• The second grouping involves 
such intangibles as the content of philosophical attitudes and the emotional 
dynamics manifested by interpersonal relationships. These revelations of the 
psychological aspects of the character give the reader a key to the future actions 
and reactions of the figure. 
• • • A sensible dividing line on the sliding scale between a well-defined 
character and the stock figure is the ability of the reader to discover more about 
the character than, for example, his name. 
Perhaps no more precise method of definition can be devised than the famous example 
given by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 
(2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931): 
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer 
might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would 
not be enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept 
wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who 
became amorous of his mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's 
"ideas" in the play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Rela-
tivity or Darwin's theory of the Origin of Species. 
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the type of literary character that is protected against copying under 
the federal statute. One reason for these requirements is the rule 
that an unauthorized taking or copying must be substantial to war-
rant judicial relief; hence, the relation of a particular character to 
other elements of the work, such as plot and theme, must be con-
sidered.21 If it is assumed that Paladin is a literary character, his 
paramount importance to DeCosta's total creation becomes obvious 
and would appear to support protection. 
Another policy underlying the character-development test, how-
ever, presents more difficulty. It is a familiar maxim of copyright 
law that only the manner of expressing an idea, and not the abstract 
idea itself, can be protected from infringement.22 The idea or "en-
lightenment" elements of a work have been described as "scientific 
formulations, factual information, and symbols of intelligible com-
munication," while the expression or "skill" elements are "distin-
guished by their order, configuration, and form."23 As applied to 
character creations, these standards dictate that the more unoriginal 
or shallow a character becomes, the more it approaches public prop-
erty; the stock character is, in effect, a symbol of communication 
that should be available for use in a wide variety of stories and 
contexts. Undeniably, Paladin could be classified as a stock char-
acter. In charging the jury, the trial court referred to the "idea 
and character of 'Paladin Have Gun Will Travel,' "24 while the 
court of appeals described the principal items of his costume and 
performance as "hallowed shelf items" and concluded that the cre-
ation was "so slight a thing as not to warrant protection under 
any law."25 
Such an analysis, however, may not give full cognizance to all 
of the relevant interests at stake in a case like Paladin. More spe-
cifically, the fact that Paladin was created and subsequently used 
in visual media (live performance and television series) may demand 
a re-examination of the type of character that should be protected. 
Copyright protection has frequently been given to comic strip char-
acters that could scarcely be called "well-developed,"26 although 
21. It seems rather obvious that the quality of a character's delineation and his 
importance to the original work will always be questions of degree. Judicial utterances 
on the subject, however, are frequently phrased in terms of clear-cut dichotomies. 
Thus in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 
950 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955), the court examined a variety 
of commercial and artistic customs and practices, but then set forth the following 
sweeping dictum: "It is conceivable that the character really constitutes the story 
being told, but if the character is only the chessman in the game of telling the story 
he is not within the area of the protection afforded by the copyright." 
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Morrissey v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 
379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
23. Spiegel, Intellectual Productions: A Policy Orientation, 36 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 500 
(1963). 
24-. Principal case at 318. 
25. Id. at 320-21. 
26. See, e.g., Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, lll F.2d 4-32 (2d Cir. 1940); 
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perhaps they could be considered somewhat individualized by virtue 
of their visual representation.27 Moreover, a popular hero of a comic 
strip is usually its most important element, and any infringement 
of this character is quite likely to be a substantial taking. A similar 
situation exists in the television industry, where the basic entity 
is the continuing series that establishes continuity among individual 
shows through its major characters. Even when a television series 
is derived from a copyrighted book, it is quite unlikely that much 
else beyond the essential aspects of the principal characters and. 
perhaps some features of the setting will be of any substantial value 
to the television producer.28 Professor Kaplan has noted that the 
process of adapting a work for presentation in a different medium 
may require massive changes merely to achieve the same basic effect 
as the original, and he has concluded that present standards of in-
fringement may not be adequate to cope with this situation.29 
There seems to be little doubt that characters per se are ex-
tremely valuable for purposes of television; one commentator has 
even asserted that "[t]he fictional character today is perhaps the 
most important commodity in the entire field of entertainment in 
the United States."30 Devices such as re-runs, the sequel series, and 
"spin-off" or transfer of a popular character into a different situa-
tion in a new series expand the use of the successful character, 31 
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). A collection of similar 
cases may be found in Waldheim, Mickey Mouse-Trademark or Copyright?, 54 
TRADEMARK REP. 865 (1964). But cf. Archie Comic Publications v. American News Co., 
204 Misc. 1060, 125 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1953), afj'd without opinion, 129 N.Y.S. 
2d 915 (1954). 
27. M. NIIIIMER, COPYRIGHT § 30, at 135 (1967). Most of the comics cases can be 
distinguished from the principal case, however, because infringement of a comic strip 
usually involves the taking of some part of the literary context in addition to piracy 
of the character itself. In Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, lll F.2d 432 
(2d Cir. 1940), the court compared the personal attributes and normal plot situations 
of the character "Superman" to those of the infringing "Wonderman," and concluded: 
So far as the pictorial representations and verbal descriptions of "Superman" 
are not a mere delineation of a benevolent Hercules, but embody an arrange-
ment of incidents and literary expressions original with the author, they are 
proper subjects of copyright and susceptible of infringement • . .. 
Id. at 433-34. The virtually complete absence of any literary context for the character 
Paladin would thus seem to preclude the grant of protection under a traditional 
copyright analysis. 
28. Kellman, The Legal Protection of Fictional Characters, 25 BROOKLYN L. REv. 
3, 4 (1958). 
29. Il. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VlEW OF COPYRIGHT 57 (1967): 
It is often thought necessary to make drastic changes of dialogue, action, and 
other elements in order to keep the picture faithful to the original [novel or 
play). But if it is a matter of nice artistic judgment how much change is needed 
to attain "sameness" in the new medium, we can anticipate difficulties in deciding 
what is infringement. It is surely wrong to assume that what Hollywood is con-
tent to call a dramatization or screen treatment of a novel or play would neces-
sarily be an infringing copy if not licensed. The fundamental that "use" is not 
the same thing as "infringement," that use short of infringement is to be en-
couraged, is relevant to these transformation cases. 
See also Wincor, The S~en Basic Program Properties, 47 TRADEMARK REP. 440 (1957). 
30. Kellman, supra note 28, at 3. 
!JI. Parish, supra note 20. 
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as does the practice of character-merchandising for a tie-m to a 
variety of commercial products.32 This latter possibility arose in the 
Paladin case, where network officials testified that they had placed 
a chess-knight symbol on the hero's holster with the thought of 
marketing it if the series proved popular.33 Significantly, it has been 
suggested that the type of character that gives rise to such great 
commercial value is not truly "well-developed" in the manner of 
a Shakespearian tragic hero but is in truth only slightly removed 
from the stereotype in terms of character depth.34 DeCosta thus 
seems to have created the most valuable kind of television char-
acter and for that reason can assert at least a strong moral claim 
for legal protection. 
However, a policy counterweight favors the network in Paladin. 
The behavior of an alleged infringer is relevant to the copyright 
function of fostering creativity. The copyist who merely duplicates 
by mechanical means is certainly less of a creator than one who seeks 
to imitate what the first author has done and thus should have less 
of a shield than the imitator.35 Similarly, one commentator has dis-
cerned in the case law a judicial tendency to balance the first au-
thor's originality against the creative quality of the imitative use, 
along with a greater reluctance to protect the "ideas" of the first work 
if it is relatively commonplace in comparison to a more innovative 
achievement.36 On a more practical level, the question of the value 
of the work taken may be incapable of rational determination where 
it does not have an identifiable market value, and the imitator has 
liberally embellished the work, embodied it in a different medium, 
and then disseminated it.37 Certainly there would be a large ele-
ment of speculation in any attempt to decide how much of the 
success of the series "Have Gun, Will Travel" was due to the in-
herent appeal of the major character, and how much was due to 
the plots, cast, and technical and commercial refinements added by 
the network. 
Notwithstanding these analytical difficulties, the equities of a 
given case may move a court to stretch copyright doctrine and grant 
protection to works that would fall within the ban on monopo-
lies for abstract ideas. Thus protection was accorded to a basic 
32. It has been estimated that the cartoon characters Mickey Mouse and Donald 
Duck have been associated with the sale of merchandise valued in excess of a billion 
dollars. Waldheim, supra note 26. 
33. Principal case at 317. 
34. Wincor, supra note 29. 
35. Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meanderings in the Area of Performers' Rights, 
9 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 819, 823 (1962). See also Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of 
Parody, Mimicry, and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 225, 253 (1962). 
36. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry Into the Constitu-
tional Distribution of Powers Over the Law of Literary Property in the United States, 
9 BULL. COPYRIGHT Sec'y 102, 124-25 (1961). 
37. Cf. Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. R.Ev. 
295, 299-300 (1954). 
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story idea38 in Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures,39 an action that was 
brought under the California intellectual property statute40 and 
which involved facts similar to the Paladin case.41 The plaintiff 
had submitted a play to a motion picture studio, and when the play 
later appeared in an unauthorized motion picture version, it was 
extensively modified. The plaintiff sought to avoid the difficult ques-
tion of the substantiality of the appropriation by asserting that the 
only thing really valuable or original in his play was the "central 
dramatic situation" involving the character of a tyrannical ship's 
captain. In the light of testimony that the studio story editor cus-
tomarily prepared brief summaries of scripts and plots presented 
to him, from which the management decided whether or not a given 
picture should be produced, the court accepted the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the "basic dramatic core" of the play should be protected, 
noting that "the real value of a story or play may have little to do 
with specific dialogues or sequences of scenes or locale .... "42 How-
ever, the Golding case was subsequently criticized for exceeding the 
bounds of common-law copyright,43 and later cases in the jurisdic-
tion have avoided the difficult problem of determining when a prop-
erty right should attach to anything which falls short of generally 
accepted definitions of literary property.44 
Clearly, the possibility of a monopoly in an entity as sweeping 
as a tyrannical ship's captain seems inimical to the copyright policy 
of free access to ideas in the public domain, regardless of the eco-
nomic damage that the creator may have suffered. Yet the frequent 
inability of traditional copyright analysis to isolate the truly valu-
able elements of a work adapted to a different medium has often 
led ·wronged creators to invoke a variety of other legal theories in 
38. On the protection of ideas generally, see Callmann, Unfair Competition in 
Ideas and Titles, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 77 (1954); Havighurst, supra note 37; Nimmer, 
The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 119 (1954); Warner, Legal Protection of Pro-
gram Ideas, 36 VA. L. REv. 289 (1950). 
39. 35 Cal. 2d 690, 221 P .2d 95 (1950). See also Kovacs v. Mutual Broadcasting 
Sys., 99 Cal. App. 2d 56, 221 P.2d 108 (1950). 
40. CAL. C1v. CODE § 980(a) (West 1954): 
The author or proprietor of any composition in letters or art has an exclusive 
ownership in the representation or expression thereof as against all persons ex-
cept one who originally and independently creates the same or a similar com-
position. 
41. The principal case is factually distinguishable from Golding because Decosta 
never submitted his creation to the network, thus precluding the use of theories of 
contract implied in fact or law; however, the Golding court did not rely heavily on 
the fact of submission. 
42. 35 Cal. 2d at 697, 221 P.2d at 98-99. 
43. Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953). 
44. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257, 263 (1956): 
It may be that plaintiff's concessions and arguments • . • are intended to sug-
gest that there is some nebulous middle area between an abstract idea and a 
literary composition, wherein the idea has been cast in "concrete" form but not 
"concrete" enough to constitute a literary property •••• However, for the pur-
poses of this ~ at least, we find it unnecessary and undesirable to recognize 
any 5uch hybnd ...• 
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support of their claims. Prominent among these related doctrines 
are misappropriation and unfair competition, and, to a lesser ex-
tent, trademark infringement.45 All of these theories were at issue 
in the Paladin case, although only the misappropriation claim was 
submitted to the jury; each raises different questions from the stand-
point of copyright pre-emption. 
The doctrine of misappropriation46 originated in the leading 
case of International News Service v. The Associated Press,41 
where the Supreme Court used principles of unfair competition to 
prevent International News Service (INS) from using news dis-
patches pirated from bulletin boards and early editions of Associ-
ated Press subscribers. The protectible interest, called "quasi-prop-
erty,"48 existed only between the two competing news services and 
did not relate to the general public's right to use any of the news 
stories. 
From this beginning, misappropriation has expanded to encom-
pass a variety of commercial ,;vrongs; indeed, in its present scope it 
has been described as the "virtual equivalent of a copyright"49 and 
"copyright protection under another name."50 The Paladin case 
illustrates this doctrinal overlap. In charging the jury on the mis-
appropriation claim, the trial court required DeCosta to show that 
he had not divested his potential common-law rights through pub-
lication; but the INS case in no way implies that copyright tests 
for divestitive publication should be applied to a misappropriation 
action.51 
The factual circumstances existing in the Paladin case, however, 
are rather far removed from the peculiar conditions that moved the 
Supreme Court to create the doctrine of misappropriation. The Asso-
ciated Press had invested considerable capital in establishing its news-
gathering network, and this socially valuable organization was threat-
45. For a discussion of the theory that undeveloped characters resemble trade-
marks, see generally Waldheim, Characters-May They Be Kidnapped?, 12 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 210, 217 (1965); Wincor, supra note 29; Note, The Protection Afforded 
Literary and Cartoon Characters Through Trademark, Unfair Competition, and Copy-
right, 68 HARV. L. REV. 349 (1954). 
46. Developments in the Law, Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 932 (1964): 
Misappropriation, which shares with passing off the general label of unfair 
competition, is one of several legal doctrines concerning protection of intangibles 
of potential commercial value. These intangibles include ideas, information, for• 
mulas, designs and artistic creations, fame, goodwill, and performances of talent 
.... Misappropriation consists not in taking the physical object [in which the 
intangible is embodied] but in copying or drawing upon the conception or under-
lying intangible value for the use of the appropriator. 
47. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
48. Id. at 236. 
49. Comment, Literary Titles-Copyrightable or Trademarkable, 11 VILL. L. REv. 
796, 813 (1966). See also Note, supra note 17, at 710 (1960). 
50. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1966). 
51. In his dissent in INS, Justice Brandeis objected to the recognition of a doctrine 
that afforded protection to intellectual property without being limited by the concept 
of divestitive publication. 248 U.S. at 254-56. 
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ened with destruction by the rival service's appropriation of news 
releases. When misappropriation is invoked to prevent the copying 
of a creative work like Paladin, on the other hand, the state's prin-
cipal interest seems to be the protection of its creators from un-
authorized exploitation of their works. In this situation, it may be 
argued that copyright is the only proper method of rewarding the 
creator's "sweat of the brow" and protecting his pecuniary interests. 
Misappropriation analysis often fails to reach the crucial question 
of what impact a grant of protection will have upon the copyright 
policy of maintaining an expansive public domain; and, in any 
event, the state's interest in preventing the copying or use of a cre-
ative work should not be sufficient justification for using rather 
vague concepts of commercial morality to frustrate federal policies 
and carve monopolies out of the public domain.52 
The results are undeniably harsh when the creator has struck 
upon a valuable commodity like Paladin; but, as Justice Holmes 
noted in his concurrence in INS, a property right does not arise 
from value alone: "Property depends upon exclusion by law from 
interference, and a person is not prohibited from using any com-
bination of words merely because someone has used it before, even 
if it took labor and genius to make it."53 Thus, the First Circuit 
had a sound basis in logic and policy, if not in authority, 54 for hold-
ing that Sears and Compco precluded the use of misappropriation 
doctrine to protect a creative work like Paladin. 
Unfair competition, however, is somewhat more difficult to fit 
into the pre-emptive framework. In the usual unfair competition 
situation, the defendant is a competitor who is trying to "pass off" 
his product as the plaintiff's and trade on the good will that the 
plaintiff has_ established.55 Thus the doctrine of unfair competition 
52. Developments in the Law, supra note 46, at 936: "Justice Pitney's image in 
INS of one who 'reaps where he has not sown' has become a watchword in the 
misappropriation vocabulary. However, a moral evaluation of the defendant's behavior 
seems an unsuitable analytical tool for discriminating between intangibles that 
should be protected and those that should not • . • .'' 
53. 248 U.S. at 246. Of course, if the legal system becomes too oblivious to com-
mercial mores the result may be a loss of control over the market in question. In this 
regard, an analogy may be drawn to the related problem of literary titles, which are 
generally regarded as unprotectible because of the dangers of creating monopolies in 
words and phrases. This policy of legal nonintervention seems to have led to the cre-
ation of extra-legal remedies for the motion picture industry, through a Title Regis-
tration Bureau with industry sanctions for violators. Netterville 8e Hirsch, Piracy and 
Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, llO (1959). See also Johnston v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (1947); Klein, 
Is Unauthorized Use of Titles of Artistic Works in Unrelated Fields Actionable Pi-
racy?, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 59 (1961); Comment, supra note 49. 
54. Several cases have held that the doctrine of misappropriation is unaffected by 
the Sears and Compco decisions. See, e.g., Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. 
Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Greater Recording Co., 
Inc. v. Stambler, 144 U.S.P.Q. 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Capitol Records v. Greatest 
Records, 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964). 
55. Doctrines of unfair competition have been extended to remedy a variety of 
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seems doubly irrelevant to the facts of the Paladin case, first because 
DeCosta did not seek any profits from his idea until the television 
show appeared, and second because it seems particularly unlikely 
that CBS through its nationwide telecasts was attempting to trade on 
the relatively small amount of good will generated by DeCosta in 
his personal appearances. But it has been held that lack of compe-
tition because of use in a different medium will not be fatal to the 
plaintiff's claim, since "it is the injury to the author and a fraud 
upon the . . . public that constitute the real offense alleged."66 A 
basic element of the injury to the creator in the case of character 
infringement may result from the fact that the general public's appe-
tite for a particular character is easily satiated, regardless of the 
medium through which the imitator exploits the character; the 
creator's market, both actual and potential, may be spoiled by in-
discriminate reproduction. 57 In essence, this rationale appears to be 
a circuitous assertion that there is always competition among char-
acters for the available audience, irrespective of whether they are 
written, performed, drawn, or filmed characters. 
Even if it be assumed that there is a kind of derivative competi-
tion among characters like Paladin, a precise description of the kind 
of public deception that is likely to ensue remains rather speculative. 
In this area unfair competition and trademark analyses may coalesce, 
if one accepts the theory that a trademark should function primarily 
to identify the source of products and services. 58 Either doctrine, 
however, also creates a decided economic benefit in the proprietor 
of a character, giving him effective protection against copying. Dan-
ger of substantial public confusion might justify the monopoly, but 
little is kno·wn about the manner in which public identification of 
commercial wrongs, and a recent commentator has concluded that "[b]ecause there is 
no clear concept of unfair competition, there is no clear theory of unfair competition." 
1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 
§ 4.1 (3d ed. 1967). In Schechter Poultry Corp: v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531-32 
(1935), Justice Hughes stated: 
"Unfair competition," as known to the common law, is a limited concept. Pri-
marily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's goods as those of a rival 
trader . . . • In recent years, its scope has been extended. It has been held to 
apply to misappropriation as well as misrepresentation .•.. Unfairness in com-
petition has been predicated of acts which lie outside the ordinary course of 
business and are tainted by fraud, or coercion, or conduct otherwise prohibited 
by law. [Footnote omitted] 
See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 46, at 908-23. 
56. Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939). 
57. Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Note, supra note 45, 
at 353; Note, supra note 17, at 712. See also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd per 
curiam: 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 
433, 194 A. 631 (1937). 
58. Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protections Afforded by Patent, Trademark, Copy-
right and Unfair Competitio~ Law: The Sources and Nature of Product Simulation 
Law, 7 P.E.A.L.Q. 30, 48-50 (1967); Note, supra note 45. 
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source applies to character creations.rm When both the original char-
acter and the infringing work appear in a pictorial medium such 
as comic strips, it may be argued that public deception will be neg-
ligible because the inherent appeal or value of the creation will 
be immediately self-evident, and the reader will not care about its 
source. 00 But a rather different line of authority has developed in the 
context of live performances and movies when an actor has evolved 
a distinctive character-type in repeated performances. 61 In this sit-
uation the performer is also the sole creator, and public identifica-
tion may be directed toward him any time that the character is used 
in advertising. The fact of repeated performance also indicates that 
the character has become popular enough to attract a public follow-
ing, thus increasing the likelihood of deception. But the Paladin 
court evidently felt that DeCosta had not attained this status, con-
cluding that "[a]t some point his innate talent and eclectic poach-
ing may enable him to attract a following, and ultimately to secure 
the law's protection against imitators."62 This strict construction of 
the public deception test is also consistent with the approach taken 
in Sears and Compco, where the Supreme Court carefully scruti-
nized the record for evidence of the nature and extent of such con-
fusion and then ruled that even when clear evidence of confusion 
is found the state may impose only the requirement that copies be 
labeled to indicate their source. 
This encroachment of commercial and other torts into the outer 
reaches of the copyright area thus causes a variety of problems that 
may not be answered by the narrow holding of the Sears and Compco 
decisions;63 for, as the doctrines range farther afield from copyright 
59. It has been suggested that a single transaction involving a product decorated 
with the picture of a cartoon character may be categorized either as a trademark use, 
a copyright use, or a combination of both. Waldheim, supra note 26, at 866-67. 
60. This was the position taken by Judge Learned Hand in National Comics Pub-
lications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951) (copying of comic 
books): 
In the case of these silly pictures nobody cares who is the producer-least of all, 
children who are the chief readers--; the "strips" sell because they amuse and 
please, and they amuse and please because they are what they are, not because 
they come from "Detective.'' 
61. The performer who has developed a distinctive character may be viewed as 
one end of a continuum that extends at the opposite extreme to the performer who 
is merely acting out a role previously created by someone else. Even in the latter sit-
uation it has been argued that the creative performer is making a valuable con-
tribution to society and should be rewarded by copyright protection. Waring v. WDAS 
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937); Comment, supra note 35. 
But the weight of authority concludes that the performer of a pre-existing role has 
an interest too ephemeral to merit protection; see, e.g., Supreme Records, Inc. v. 
Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. Calif. 1950). It would seem that the 
interpretational techniques of the performer of a pre-existing role should be regarded 
as a kind of universal language of the theater that should be freely available for sub-
sequent performers to apply to other works. Cf. O'Brien v. Chappel &: Co., 159 F. 
Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
62. Principal case at 320. 
63. It has been argued that the references to copyright in Sears and Compco were 
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analysis, they begin to include diverse state interests-such as protec-
tion against deception of the public, breaches of confidential rela-
tionships, and emotional harm to individuals-as elements of the 
cause of action. Moreover, classes of works that could have been 
given statutory protection under Congress' copyright power, but 
which are outside the ambit of the present Act, are frequent candi-
dates for state protection. Paladin is an excellent example of this 
type of creation, if he is considered a "pure" character, independent 
of any underlying work. The First Circuit felt that Congress could 
easily devise a system for registering character creations and implied 
from Congress' refusal to do so a policy of free use and dissemina-
tion of characters.64 But few post-Sears cases have followed this line 
of reasoning, and the impact of Sears and Compco on this area of 
"unused" copyright power is proving to be quite a fertile battle-
ground. 65 
It has been suggested that the courts should be allowed to in-
terpret the congressional silence and to determine on an ad hoc basis 
whether the grant of protection to a given kind of work would be 
inimical to the federal statutory scheme.66 Indeed, the whole trend 
toward greater use of copyright-related doctrines may be viewed as 
a creative and commendable judicial response to the inadequacies of 
the federal Act: 
The bric-a-brac coverage of the copyright, trademark, and patent 
laws fail[s] time and again to provide for the situation. Of course, 
the failure of the statute would be a potent ground for nonprotec-
tion if, in truth, the copyright act was a "delicate and elaborate" 
preemptive structure. But there is the nagging feeling that the reason 
for nonprotection isn't a careful balancing on the part of Congress; 
rather, it is the inability of the legislators to resolve incredibly 
difficult problem which strike at the heart of the copyright structure 
.... The judge is faced with the type of piracy which the Constitu-
tion probably meant for Congressional action. But Congress has 
been unable to act. 67 
Under this approach, not even the passage of a revised Copyright 
Act would justify total pre-emption, since there is an inherent lag in 
congressional response as new media and art forms develop. 68 
obiter dicta, Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 247 
F. Supp. 578, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1965), or were included because of the remote possibility 
that the designs of the industrial articles in question could have been copyrighted. 
Kestenbaum, The Sears and Compco Cases: A Federal Right to Compete by Copying, 
51 A.B.A.J. 935, 938 (1965). These arguments hardly seem persuasive. 
64. 377 F.2d at 319. 
65. See cases cited in note 7 supra. 
66. Bender, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1228, 
1238 (1964). 
67. Price, The Moral Judge and the Copyright Statute: The Problem of Stifjel and 
Compco, 14 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 91, 113 (1966). 
68. Id. at 116-17. 
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This theory of partial pre-emption with interstitial state protec-
tion raises several practical and conceptual problems. Even after 
Sears and Compco, it is a rare court that will conclude that a par-
ticular grant of protection is inimical to the policies of the Copy-
right Act. An inevitable consequence of granting this kind of discre-
tion to the courts is inconsistency of result; yet the need for a 
nationally uniform copyright law was asserted by Madison in 
Federalist No. 43.69 If uniformity was desirable in Madison's day, 
it is particularly compelling in an era of mass media,70 when choice 
of law problems can become complex to the point of insolubility71 
and the most protective state standard may attain extraterritorial 
effect in application to national broadcasts. Moreover, there is scant 
likelihood that individual decisions will be correct in assessing the 
multifarious conflicting interests involved, since courts "must judge 
upon records prepared by litigants, which ... cannot disclose the 
conditions of [the particular] industry, or of the others which may 
be involved.''72 Grants of unlimited monopoly protection will almost 
necessarily subvert the federal policy of forcing creators to seek the 
limited protection of the Act; the result would be that "[ o ]mission 
of property from the act would be a bonanza for those who possessed 
property of that kind.''73 The conclusion that pre-emption should 
extend to all classes of works not encompassed by the federal Copy-
right Act also draws support from the nature of the copyright power 
itself, for "[ c]opyright, unlike commerce, is a narrow field where the 
presence of a compendious statute quite naturally invites the infer-
ence that rights are not to be created dehors the statute.''74 
For works within the confines of the granted copyright power, 
yet not within the ambit of the Act, this broad a doctrine of statu-
tory pre-emption is coextensive with the doctrine of constitutional 
pre-emption that Judge Learned Hand advocated when he said that 
the copyright clause acts ex proprio vigore as a limit on both the states 
and the federal courts.75 The Sears and Compco opinions, though 
somewhat ambiguous, may be interpreted as expounding a constitu-
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 338 (Hamilton ed., 1868). 
70. See generally Posner, State and Federal Power in Patent and Copyright, 14 
COPYRIGHT L. SYM. 51, 70-74 (1966). 
71. The court in the principal case noted the problem, observing that "[cJounsels' 
failure to address it in their briefs is a tribute to its perplexity." Principal case at 
319 n.7. For a discussion of the conflicts theories that have been used when privacy 
is invaded by the mass media, see Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 
229 F.2d 481, 484-85, 493-95 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Ludwig, 
"Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces Vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN. L. REv. 734, 
759-62 (1948). 
72. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929). 
73. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1940), afj'd, 312 
U.S. 457 (1941). 
74. Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol Records Case, 69 HARV. 
L. REv. 409, 430 (1956). 
75. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 
1955) (dissenting opinion). 
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tional doctrine of pre-emption since they purported to base the ex-
clusiveness of federal power on the patent and copyright system, 
which logically would include both the federal Act and the consti-
tutional clause. In addition, Justice Black, the author of the Sears and 
Compco opinions, later cited those decisions in his dissent to Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. as au-
thority for the proposition that there is a "constitutional plan of a 
competitive economy."76 
Thus, either a broad statutory or a constitutional theory of pre-
emption would extend to all kinds of creative works within the 
scope of Congress' power; but the minimum conditions that must be 
met before Congress' copyright power becomes operative have never 
been defined with certainty. In addition to the provision that pro-
tection be given for limited times, the portions of the copyright 
clause that may serve as limitations on the power conferred are the 
introductory phrase "to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts" and the words "authors" and "writings." The key factor 
commonly extracted from the policy of promoting science and the 
arts and from the inclusion of the word "authors" has been described 
as "independent creation"77 or "originality"78 and probably does 
not include such additional requirements as novelty, ingenuity, or 
esthetic merit.79 The term "·writings" has similarly received a broad 
interpretation and is currently regarded as encompassing any ex-
pression of intellectual creation that is embodied in a tangible 
medium80 so that it is capable of being reproduced. 
Even this broad a doctrine of pre-emption, however, may not be 
sufficient to dispose of the Paladin case. DeCosta argued that Con-
gress could not enact copyright protection for the character Paladin. 
Presumably the argument was based on the premise that the calling 
cards did not embody the essence of his creation; hence, disseminat-
ing them did not dedicate all of his rights in the character Paladin, 
and the state should be free to regulate the remainder as a "non-
writing. "81 Clearly, no theory of statutory pre-emption, however ex-
tensive, could prevent state regulation if Paladin was in fact beyond 
the reach of the copyright power granted to Congress by the Consti-
tution. 
76. 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964). 
77. Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1079, 1086 (1959). 
78. M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 3.2, 6 (1967). See also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
79. This is the premise of the House Judiciary Committee's Report on the Pro• 
posed Copyright Act Revision. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1966). 
80. M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 8.2 (1967). But cf. Note, Copyright-Study of the 
Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1263 
(1956). 
81. Compare the passing remark by Judge Learned Hand in his dissent to Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 667 (2d Cir. 1955), to the effect 
that the states "of course" have the power to protect " 'works' that arc not '\Vritings.' " 
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To this contention the First Circuit responded that "there comes 
a point when what is created is so slight a thing as not to warrant 
protection by any law" and then stated: 
[I]n view of the federal policy of encouraging intellectual creation 
by granting a limited monopoly at best, we think it sensible to say 
that the constitutional clause extends to any concrete, describable 
intellectual creation; and to the extent that a creation may be in-
effable, we think it ineligible for protection against copying sim-
pliciter under either state or federal law.82 
The quoted passage seems to indicate that the copyright clause may 
have a pre-emptive effect beyond the confines of the granted copy-
right power itself. And, although it is obvious that state power must 
become exclusive at some point where a given entity ceases to re-
semble the type of creative work that copyright protects, there may 
be sound reasons for setting this threshold beyond the inception of 
the congressional power. In terms of Sears and Compco, there is at 
least a close parallel between saying that a state cannot prevent copy-
ing of a mechanical article so lacking in invention that it cannot 
be protected under the patent power, and saying that the states 
cannot prevent copying of a work that is so lacking in originality 
or tangible expression that it is ineligible £or protection under the 
copyright power.83 
The concept of pre-emption beyond the area of power granted to 
Congress by the copyright clause is perhaps most immediately rele-
vant to the large gray area where copyright-based doctrines of literary 
property and performers' rights verge imperceptibly into the tort 
of invasion of privacy. An examination of the cases in this area 
reveals the extent of doctrinal confusion that prevails, as well as 
the ingenuity of courts and litigants in molding a wide variety of 
legal theories to fit similar £act situations.84 Paladin is an excellent 
82. Principal case at 320. 
83. But cf. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A 
Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 386-87 (1951) (footnote omitted, emphasis in original): 
The analogy between patent law and copyright is not an apt one. • . . [T]hose 
objects which are patented are primarily intended to be put to a commercial or 
industrial use. Absolute power of disposition in the hands of the inventor or his 
assignor, if extended for too long a period, will create a monopoly capable of 
actively working against the public interest ...• [Literary works] generally have 
no effect on the progress of a State's economy or welfare. Furthermore, a valid 
copyright does not prevent another from using the ideas expressed ...• Undeni-
ably, the threat of monopoly is greater where patents rather than copyrights are 
involved. 
However, the Supreme Court in Sears apparently rejected this distinction. Sears, Roe-
buck &: Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964). 
84. Some leading examples of the successful application of diverse theories to 
similar fact situations are Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962) 
(mimicry of famous voice on television commercial held to be defamation by associa-
tion of performer with type of work "below his class'); Ettore v. Philco Television 
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (pro-
fessional boxer's "right to control the scope or reach of his own services" as embodied 
in film held cognizable under doctrine of unfair competition, even though he had 
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example of the possibility of multiple classification: in addition to 
theories of common-law copyright, misappropriation, unfair com-
petition, and trademark, the character could plausibly be analyzed 
in terms of DeCosta's privacy rights. DeCosta in a sense was Paladin, 
since the character grew out of his youthful experiences and was 
probably the only name by which he was kno·wn to a sizeable num-
ber of people. And, given the fact that DeCosta sought not remunera-
tion but rather "the entertainment of others,"85 it could be argued 
that the most appropriate measure of damages would be the emo-
tional harm that he suffered when CBS exploited his character and 
lured his audience away. 
The reason for confusion between the doctrines of privacy and 
copyright may be found in the nature of the right to privacy as 
Warren and Brandeis first conceived it. To its creators, the right to 
privacy was the right to control the communication of personality 
values, and copyright doctrines were one method by which the law 
had sought to guarantee this sweeping right: 
The common law secures to each individual the right of determin-
ing, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions 
shall be communicated to others .... The existence of this right does 
not depend on the particular method of expression adopted. . . . 
Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or 
value of the thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the 
means of expression .... It may exist independently of any corporeal 
being, as in words spoken, a song sung, a drama acted.86 
In short, both copyright and privacy involve the interplay of com-
munications media and the human personality; indeed, one com-
long since quit the ring; privacy claim rejected); Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 
U.S.P.Q. 537 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964) (use of recorded performance several years later 
than anticipated impaired value of singer's current recording contract and unfairly 
caused her to compete with herself); Lennon v. Pulsebeat News, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 
309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) ("Beatles" singing group given common-law copyright in a 
recorded interview because "their distinctive manner of speech and expression" wa~ 
valuable property); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 
Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (reproduction of news broadcast in 
phonograph record "a clear case of appropriation" since broadcaster's style of talking 
is "the foundation and source of employment and income" as well as "his personality, 
a form of art expression''); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 
194 A. 631 (1937) (orchestra conductor's recorded musical interpretation protectible 
either as artistic property or under unfair competition principles; concurring judge 
felt that essence of complaint was invasion of privacy). But see Shostakovich v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), 
afj'd mem. 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949) (Russian composer's claim that 
use of his uncopyrighted music in a motion picture critical of the Soviet government 
implied his "endorsement or participation," thereby violating his moral right as com-
poser and his privacy right under a New York statute, as well as defaming him and 
inflicting injury without just cause; held insufficient to sustain a motion for injunc-
tion). 
85. Principal case at 316. 
86. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. R.Ev. 193, 198-99 (1890). 
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mentator has suggested that the test which should be used to identify 
the type of creativity that copyright seeks to foster is whether or not 
the creator has succeeded in imposing his personality on a medium 
to such a degree that an observer can recognize aspects of the per-
sonality in the completed work.87 
The law of privacy, however, has not settled on a single unifying 
principle like "creativity,"88 perhaps because of the difficulty of 
classifying the ways in which media can be used and misused. Even 
a simple instance of medium-misuse may have a wide range of 
possible effects upon the individual, since a given misuse may inflict 
emotional harm, economic damage, or a combination of both. For 
example, the person who is unwillingly pictured in a product ad-
vertisement may be concerned only by the fact that he has been de-
prived of the economic value of the use of his photograph; his 
complaint is essentially one of unjust enrichment.89 Additionally, 
the plaintiff may feel that his personal good will has been damaged 
by association with inferior goods, or through such saturation of the 
market that he appears greedy. The gravamen of the wrong could 
thus be derived from unfair competition, based on the implied mis-
representation that the goods in some sense emanate from or are ap-
proved by the plaintiff.90 The same use of a photograph in an 
advertisement could also be objectionable because it is personally 
embarrassing to the plaintiff91 or cheapens his personality;92 carried 
to the extreme, the context or content of a photograph could be so 
deeply humiliating as to be defamatory.93 In short, a medium of 
communication possesses a twofold capability for harm: it may dis-
seminate the plaintiff's actions (or evidence of his past actions) to a 
wider audience or market than he had desired; and it may misrep-
87. Whichcr, The Case of the Horror Monsters: A.rt as Law, A.rt as Fact, 9 Buu.. 
CoP\'RIGHT Soc'y 472, 479 (1962). See also Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (1956). 
88. Compare Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960), with Bloustein, Privacy 
as an A.spect of Human Dignity: A.n A.nswer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 962 
(1964) and Rider, Legal Protection of the Manifestations of Individual Personality-
The Identity-Indicia, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 31 (1959). 
89. Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.) 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and 
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966); Nimmer, The Right of 
Publicity, 19 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954). 
90. Hogan v. A. S. Barnes &: Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957). See also Wald-
heim, Mickey Mouse-Trademark or Copyright?, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 865, 867 (1964). 
91. Sinclair v. Postal Telegraph &: Cable Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1935). 
92. H. M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EJ\."TENSIONS OF MAN 170 (Signet 
Books ed., 1964): 
(T]he camera tend[s] to turn people into things, and the photograph extends 
and multiplies the human image to the proportions of mass-produced merchan-
dise. The movie stars and matinee idols are put in the public domain by photog-
raphy . • •• They can be bought and hugged and thumbed more easily than 
public prostitutes. 
93. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 
F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936); Russell v. Marlboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959); 
Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1093 (1962). 
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resent, either expressly or impliedly, the kind or quality of actions 
he performed. 94 
Furthermore, the subject matter that a medium embodies or 
transmits may itself be creative: for example, a work of sculpture 
may be embodied in a photograph. Clearly, the propriety of this 
kind of use should be judged by copyright principles. But when the 
subject matter before the camera is a human being, the distinction 
may not be so easy; as the Paladin court noted, "[a]ll human beings 
-and a good part of the animal kingdom-create characters every 
day of their lives."95 Courts have occasionally come close to recogniz-
ing a copyright-privacy dichotomy in the latter situation by distin-
guishing between the privacy claimant who is an unprotected "actual 
participant" or performer in a public event and the "mere spectator" 
who cannot be "singled out" of the crowd by mass media.96 The 
distinction is appealing insofar as the conscious performer is more 
likely to suffer economic damage than he is to experience emotional 
harm and hence would be less able to assert the kind of interest 
that the law of privacy is designed to protect. In addition, the con-
scious performer should have greater notice of the possible uses of his 
performance, which would enable him to impose contractual limita-
tions on the use of his services. But practical application of the "ac-
tual participant" standard is far from satisfactory: for example, a 
literal application of the rule may prevent the publication of an 
esthetically pleasing candid photograph, the television use of close-
ups of spectators at a public or sporting event, or the incidental 
depiction of the inhabitants of a city as part of a motion picture 
travelogue.97 The possibility of deterring the use of such subject 
matter, and other matters mote socially important, may be sufficient 
94. Compare Gieseking v. Urania Records, 17 Misc. 2d 1034, 1035, 155 N.Y.S.2d 
171, 172 (Sup. Ct. 1956): "A performer has a property right in his performance that 
it shall not be used for a purpose not intended, and particularly in a manner which 
does not fairly represent his service.'' The fact that some media can embody actions 
and store them for later use may also cause the plaintiff embarrassment if, for ex-
ample, he is a performer whose style has changed markedly in the interval between 
embodiment and release. Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 537 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. 1964); McAndrews v. Roy, 131 S.2d 256 (La. 1961). 
The analysis based on widespread dissemination and fair representation may be 
harmonized with Dean Prosser's division of the law of privacy into the separate 
wrongs of intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, giving the plaintiff a false light 
in the public eye, and appropriation of a name or likeness. "\\T. PROSSER, To&ts § 112 
(3d ed. 1964). The first two of these torts seem to be based primarily upon widespread 
dissemination, while the false light and appropriation cases are concerned principally 
with unfair representation of the plaintiff's services. 
95. Principal case at 320. 
96. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). 
97. In Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc., 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 
(1932), afj'd per curiam, 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E. 713 (1933) an injunction was granted 
restraining the showing of a motion-picture travelogue which included an unautho-
rized six-second closeup of a lady street vendor. The decision was criticized for being 
unduly restrictive in Sarat Habiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 781, 295 N.Y.S. 
382, 388 (1937). 
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to restrict sharply the scope of the right to privacy in its application 
to mass media. 98 
Finally, the various media themselves have different character-
istics00 and may be used in different ways. The camera, for instance, 
is able to reproduce events with complete verisimilitude, while a 
·written factual description of the same events will probably contain 
some subjective or interpretive elements.100 The legal system has 
long recognized the social importance of media as conduits of in-
formation, according them a broad privilege when they are dealing 
with "newsworthy" events.101 But even technological media such as 
photographic equipment have the inherent ability to distort the 
"truth,"102 as well as the capacity to serve as a means of artistic 
creation.103 They may, in turn, be part of a larger creative process; 
for example, the motion picture may combine creative photography 
with a written script, musical background, and selective editing. 
It would seem that the creatively-used medium, of whatever 
nature, should have free access to a public domain that consists in 
part of the life histories and actions of living people. The implica-
tions of this concept have been developed most fully in cases involv-
ing the familiar medium of the written word. The multitude of 
types, genres, and styles of writing have in large measure frustrated 
the courts' attempts to establish a separate category of informational 
prose. In cases where the defendant has produced a biography or 
other work which purports to be based on factual incidents in the 
98. In Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953) a pri-
vacy claim based on the publication of an unauthorized photograph taken in a public 
place was rejected, in part because of the possibility of deterring all photographs of 
street scenes. The court stated that any privacy rights in the pose had been waived 
when the plaintiffs assumed the pose in a public place: 
The photograph of plaintiffs merely permitted other members of the public, who 
were not at plaintiffs' place of business at the time it was taken, to see them as 
they had voluntarily exhibited themselves .••• [P]laintiffs' right to privacy as to 
this photographed incident ceased and it in effect became a part of the public 
domain •.•• 
Id. at 230, 253 P.2d at 444. 
99. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra. 
100. Compare Silver, Privacy and the First Amendment, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 553, 
566 (1966): 
[I]s not biography itself, as an art form, a selection of certain "meaningful" por-
tions of someone's life to "illustrate" the primary qualities of that life? Often, 
"truth" is elusive, especially when the biographer attempts to assess character, 
which is the heart of the average biography. To require "substantial truth," at 
least in this realm, would be to require too much-at least by constitutional 
standards. 
See also Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6, 19-20 (10th Cir. 1952) 
(dissenting opinion). 
IOI. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 112, at 844-50 (3d ed. 1964). 
102. See cases cited in notes 91, 93-94 supra. 
103. As early as 1884 the Supreme Court held that a portrait photograph was a 
creative work eligible for copyright protection because of the photographer's origi-
nality in "selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various acces-
sories ••• arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and 
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression • • • ." 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
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plaintiff's life, but which in fact distorts or fictionalizes some of the 
events, it has frequently been held that the :fictionalization gives rise 
to an inference that the defendant is appropriating an episode of 
the plaintiff's life for commercial purposes.104 The Supreme Court 
recently concluded that this type of analysis imposes too great a 
risk of "chilling" the dissemination of factual information which 
rightfully belongs in the public domain, since the line between fact 
and fiction is a rather tenuous one. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,105 the 
Court held that a privacy action based on a factually inaccurate 
magazine article must meet the defamation standard of knowing 
or reckless falsehood. Justice Douglas, concurring in the decision, 
gave passing notice to the possible connection between the concepts 
of free dissemination of factual news and free access to the public 
domain for purposes of creation: "A fictionalized treatment of the 
event is, in my view, as much in the public domain as would be a 
watercolor of the assassination of a public official. It seems to me 
irrelevant to talk of any right of privacy in this context."106 A sub-
sequent commentator has argued that the Court did not pursue this 
line of reasoning far enough, since application of the knowing or 
reckless falsehood standard to works that do not purport to be 
factually accurate is artificial and fails to take cognizance of the fact 
that the creative work may make significant social contributions 
wholly apart from its factual content.107 A theory of constitutional 
pre-emption beyond the area of power specifically granted to Con~ 
gress by the copyright clause is perhaps the doctrinal bridge that is 
needed to define a unified and coherent territory of public domain, 
from which all media-users may gather the raw materials of creativity. 
There are probably few instances in which a predominantly 
creative embodiment of individual actions inflicts significant emo-
tional damage, and these instances may not be an unduly heavy 
price to pay for the existence of robust media. Moreover, the adop-
104. See, e.g., Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 
1953); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965), 
aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E. 543 (1966). Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne &: Heath, 188 
Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, aff'd, 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947). This 
decision was subsequently vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239 (1967), for further 
consideration in the light of Time, Inc. v. Hill (see text accompanying notes 105-06 
supra). The court of appeals then concluded that the use of invented dialogue and 
incidents in a biography for children constituted knowing falsity within the meaning 
of Hill. 36 U.S.L.W. 2438 (N.Y. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1968). This interpretation of Hill 
seems to establish a more stringent standard of accuracy for biographical and quasi-bio-
graphical works than had the earlier New York cases. See, e.g., Youssoupoff v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., 41 Misc. 2d 42, 244 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 19 App. 
Div. 2d 865, 244 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963) wherein a defense of substantial accuracy, taking 
into account the conventions of the particular medium and genre, was successful. 
See also Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 726, 268 N.Y.S.2d 
531, aff'd mem., 25 App. Div. 2d 719, 269 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1966). 
105. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
106. Id. at 401. 
107. Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment: The Implications 
of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 926, 943 (1967). 
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tion of such a rule need not leave the individual wholly defenseless 
to the possible abuses of mass media. The potential for harm in-
herent in mixed works of fact and fiction, such as the ":fictionalized" 
biography, could be ameliorated by using the analogy of Sears and 
Compco to impose strict labeling requirements, including a detailed 
description of the parts of the work that are nonfactual. And, in 
cases where the medium causes a truly outrageous distortion of the 
personality, the Hill case implies that an action for defamation is 
the appropriate remedy, although the concept of what constitutes a 
"true" representation needs further development in its application 
to pictorial works. 
Such an approach offers far better hope for national uniformity 
than the less drastic alternatives. Limitations on state power such as 
that contained in the proposed copyright revision bill, which pro-
vides that state remedies are permissible "as long as the causes of 
action contain elements ... that are different in kind from copyright 
protection,"108 have been shown by the post-Sears cases to be feeble 
restrictions on the courts, when amorphous concepts like emotional 
harm and public deception can be applied mechanically to nearly 
any situation. Uniform treatment of the national media should be 
the controlling necessity; yet very possibly what is needed is selective 
uniformity of protection rather than total laissez faire. Copyright 
concepts of originality and creativity demand further exploration 
and may eventually encompass a greatly expanded range of person-
ality values comparable to those secured by the civil-law doctrine of 
moral right.109 Certainly a more comprehensive investigation of the 
myriad relationships that exist between individuals and communi-
cations media is imperative; but using the courts as laboratories 
for the piecemeal extension of copyright protection may in effect 
deter the mass media from popularizing new kinds and techniques 
of creation and dilute the impetus for development of a more com-
prehensive federal scheme of regulation for the creative media. 
108. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1966). The relevant statutory 
provisions are S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1967); H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 301 (1967). 
109. Claims based on a theory of moral right usually have been denied by Amer-
ican courts. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947). But a moral 
right theory may bear close relationship to accepted causes of action such as defama-
tion or invasion of privacy. Cf. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 
196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afj'd mem., 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S. 
2d 430 (1949). On the general outlines of the doctrine of moral right, see M. NIMMER, 
COPYRIGHT § 110 (1967); Katz, supra note 83; Kury, Protection for Creators in the 
United States and Abroad, 13 COPYRIGHT L. SYM. I (1964). 
